

NSS 8910-331/13

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

18910 - 331/13 VOL "11"

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OTTAWA, ONT.
CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (NAVAL SERVICE)

ns1057 - 173 - 5 Vol.1

NOTICE

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OTTAWA, ONT.
CANADA

STAFF

REFERRED TO:

Initials	Date
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File No.
F.D.
Vol.

Letter No.

INF.

SEC

Re

1245

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NAVAL MESSAGE

To:

From:

NOIC SYDNEY
(R) NSHQ
C IN C CNA
FONF

~~BITTERSWEET~~

18910 - 331/13

CNS
ACNS
DOD
DTD
D OF P
OIC
DWT

ASSUMING TRACK (C) CABOT STRAIT PATROL.

232245Z

T/T CODE 240016Z/4/45 JMM 21296

24

CONFIDENTIAL
NO. 100-10000
100-10000

NAVY MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
IMPORTANT

From:

NOIO SYDNEY
(L) NEW
C IN C GAT
PORT

BITTERSWEET

ASSEMBLING TRACK (C) GABOT STRAIT PATROL

2322452

ONE
AGNS
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D OF P
OIC
DWT

WT CODE 24001624115 2322

103602

Naval Service --- MINUTE SHEET ---

FILE NO. 1057-173-5 LETTER NO.

vol 1

REFERRED TO REMARKS (WITH INITIALS AND DATE)

CIRCULATED FOR INFORMATION OF		INIT. DATE
C.N.E.S.		
A/CNES.		
I.C.B.		
S.I.T.D.		
1-10 A/S.		
S.C.D.		
R.F.O.		
S.L.O.		
S.C.I.		
P.C.		
E.		
D.N.O.		
SEC. ST.		

4/29/8

PA per

DEPT. NUMBER

See Admiralty Assessment Committee
Report Serial No. 32, dated 17/7/42,
Precis of Attack by BITTERSWEET on
13/5/42 (filed in A/S office).

Q/ Eugene W. Johnston

Sir

(A.R. Pressey)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF ANTI-SUBMARINE.

30 September, 1942.

*Please P.A.
Bm
23 Oct 44*

✓ C.N.E.S. BRANCH

REFERRED TO:-

LETTER NO:

FILE NO:

F.D. NO:

P. N. O.

[Signature]
10-8



N.C.R. (CONF.)

This correspondence should
be on N.S.1057-173-5 "Submarine
Attacks".

A. Pressey

(A.R. Pressey)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF ANTI-SUBMARINE.

7 August, 1942.

NAVAL SERVICE

18910-331/13

ARP:MH

N.S. 1057-173-5

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF.

Subject: Report of Proceedings -
H.M.C.S. "BITTERSWEET",
11-12th May, 1942.

Bittersweet's Paragraph 23.

The Commanding Officer's opinion as regards Amplifier A/S 44 has no technical backing. This type of amplifier, properly adjusted, is quite satisfactory. It is considered the Commanding Officer should have insisted the Maintenance Staff at Londonderry adjust his set correctly before leaving harbour.

Result of Attacks - Insufficient information to make any assessment apart from the fact that it is considered submarines were attacked in both cases.

Extraneous Information - F.O.N.F. has brought up the subject of challenging, referring to paragraph 14 of Bittersweet's report. This would appear to require Staff consideration as to policy that should be adopted in similar circumstances.


D.A.S.

I don't see how a policy or instruction could be laid down for such incidents. The circumstances are so variable that it would seem advisable to leave the decision in the hands of the C.O.

A. Pressey

(A.R. Pressey)
Commander, R.C.N.
DIRECTOR OF ANTI-SUBMARINE.

Ottawa, 18th July, 1942.



SECRET.

IV

Subject.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET.

From CAPTAIN (D), NEWFOUNDLAND, OLD KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS
BUILDING, ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND.

Date 23rd June, 1942.

No.301/1.

To FLAG OFFICER, NEWFOUNDLAND FORCE.

Submitted with reference to your No. 08821/PR/BT of
4th June, 1942.

2-. If the vessels were each proceeding at 10 knots they
would have met in approximately one minute, and it is considered
that the Commanding Officer, H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET was correct in
altering course initially to avoid.

3-. He should certainly have challenged before attacking a
ship not seen to be a submarine.

4-. However, no form of recognition system, apart from
silhouette, etc., definitely established the vessel challenged as
an enemy, and these systems can only be of value in establishing
the friendly characters of a stranger, or that she is suspicious.

CIRCULATED FOR
INFORMATION OF

INIT. DATE

C.N.E.S.
A/C.N.E.S.
I.C.E.
S.T.L.D.
D.A/S

S.B.D.
R.L.O.
S.L.O.
D.D.E.S.
S.C.L.
D.G.O.
D.N.S.
D.N.O.
SEC(Sup)
P.A.
B.F.

FLAG OFFICER

JUN 25 1942

Ref. DG 344/PR/BT
NEWFOUNDLAND FORCE

L.R. Murray

36709

CAPTAIN, R.C.N.

DEPT.
NATIONAL DEFENCE

JUL 15 1942

N.S. 1057-173-5
CANADA

1057-173-5

Ref.No. DG 445/PR/BT

TO:- The Secretary, Naval Board,
Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa.
(Copies to:- The Commander-in-Chief Western Approaches.
Commander Task Force 24.)

Submitted for the information of the Department,
concurring with Captain (D).

Naval Offices,
St. John's,
Newfoundland,
27th June, 1942.

L.W. Murray
(L. W. Murray),
Rear Admiral, R.C.N.,
Flag Officer Newfoundland Force.

SECRET.

Subject.

AN D 12⁰⁰ / 13⁰⁰ MAY

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 11th-12th MAY - H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET

From COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET.

Date 19th May, 1942.

To CAPTAIN (D), NEWFOUNDLAND.

36709

During the afternoon of May 11th, U.S.S. GLEAVES and U.S.C.G.C. SPENCER left the convoy to make extensive sweeps in the vicinity. An R/T signal was later received from U.S.S. GLEAVES that she had forced a submarine to surface at 1800 and would be late rejoining the convoy.

2-. Due to the fact that submarines were known to be in the vicinity, crew were in two watches, and watch below were ordered to sleep fully clothed.

3-. At 2300 two explosions were heard in the vicinity of the convoy and immediately afterwards rockets were seen on the port side of the convoy and the convoy was illuminated with snowflakes.

4-. We were at this time approximately 4000 yards ahead of column 4. Action Stations were rung and we proceeded to port and down the port side of the convoy keeping approximately 3,000 yards off, in accordance with Senior Officer's orders. No U-Boats were sighted or Asdic Contacts made.

5-. W/T Officer was ordered to report to Senior Officer that the convoy was being attacked, but H.M.C.S. SHEDIAC's report was transmitted first. W/T Officer reported that U.S.S. GLEAVES signals were very weak, and I therefore assumed that U.S.S. GLEAVES was then some distance from the convoy.

6-. At 2310 numerous lights were seen which we immediately closed and found to be lifeboats and rafts. Thirteen survivors were picked up from two lifeboats from PT II The "EMPIRE DELL", by which time it was observed that H.M.C.S. SHEDIAC and the rescue ship BURY were also picking up survivors. I decided to leave rescue work to them and left to resume station, U.S.C.G.C. SPENCER at this time (2335) also being seen in the vicinity. While proceeding to station convoy was again completely illuminated with snowflakes, and I reported to U.S.S. GLEAVES that convoy was again being attacked. A further report was sent to U.S.S. GLEAVES at 0100 that I believed three ships had been torpedoed, that I had been picking up survivors and that I was then rejoining the convoy.

7-. At 0100 an R.D.F. Contact was picked up on the port side of the convoy at 7000 yards. At 0110 the R.D.F. Contact at 4000 yards was observed to be closing the convoy, so three star shells were fired which illuminated H.M.C.S. ARVIDA leading towards the convoy. Between 0120 and 0140 three depth charges were dropped as a possible deterrent to any U-Boats in the vicinity.

8-. At 0315 I ordered H.M.C.S. SHEDIAC by R/T to remain with the rescue ship picking up survivors. She replied that believed all survivors had been picked up and was rejoining the convoy with BURY, but later reported that they were again picking up survivors.

9-.....

9-. In the meantime I was continuing to hunt round in the vicinity of the port bow and side of the convoy, which had, by R.D.F. bearing and ranges, obviously made an emergency alteration of course to starboard. Occasional snow flakes were observed to be fired when we would close the convoy, but no U-Boats were sighted or Asdic Contacts made. Due to the small number of escort vessels I considered that it was of greater importance that I should remain on station hunting for U-Boats rather than to look for survivors.

10-. A very weak echo was picked up by asdic at 0320 which was classified as non-sub, but two D/C's were dropped.

11-. In my opinion snowflakes used this night by merchant vessels, while illuminating the convoy extremely well, were not of much value in lighting up the area around the convoy.

12-. On instructions from the Senior Officer the 13 survivors from the EMPIRE DELL were transferred to EMPIRE CLIVE on the afternoon of the 12th.

13-. During the afternoon of May 12th GLEAVES and SPENCER had left convoy to carry out their usual extensive sweeps. An R/T signal was later intercepted from SPENCER to GLEAVES stating that the ship had encountered two submarines on the surface at 2100Z. At dusk we were unable to see GLEAVES who was not due back until after dark. At this time we were ahead of convoy, H.M.C.S. ALGOMA on the starboard beam and H.M.C.S. ARVIDA on the port beam, H.M.C.S. SHEDIAC and BURY had not rejoined convoy after picking up survivors the previous night.

14-. Convoy was due to make alteration of course from 270° to 180° in two turns of 45° each at 2215 and 2235 respectively. At 2140 we were on port leg of zigzag, my intention being to get into position for the first alteration of course. We were approximately 4000 yards ahead of column 3. At this time signalman on watch reported an object bearing Green 20. It was very dark with light misty rain and visibility was poor, and being quite unable to make out this object I called to R.D.F. operator who reported echo ahead, range 800 yards closing rapidly. I could just dimly make out something white, and thinking that this object might be H.M.C.S. ARVIDA, I unfortunately gave the order 20° starboard helm. Immediately afterwards this vessel passed rapidly down our port side, the white that I had seen being the wash and phosphorescence around her hull. I gave the order Hard to Port and Full Ahead steadying the ship on what I judged to be this vessel's course and opened fire with star shells. No sign of the submarine was seen, but while cruising towards the convoy we twice dropped two charges from the rails. That it was a submarine I am now quite convinced, for shortly afterwards either rockets or snowflakes were fired from the convoy.

15-. At 2222 we passed an R/T signal to S.O. Escort that the convoy was being attacked. On this occasion also GLEAVE's signals were weak, and as on the previous night I believed that she was some distance from the convoy.

16-. At 2235 H.M.C.S. SHEDIAC called on R/T requesting our position, course and speed. Thinking that H.M.C.S. SHEDIAC was following behind convoy with the rescue ship BURY, I gave her the position in which convoy had been attacked, and our course, and ordered her to pass through the position and along our course to look for survivors.

17-. H.M.C.S. ARVIDA had advised me by R/T that she had sighted torpedo track, and in reply I asked her to try to ascertain if any ships had been torpedoed. ARVIDA reported that

a ship had been torpedoed.....

a ship had been torpedoed but that she had been at extreme range and lost bearing.

18-. At 0005 snowflakes or rockets were fired in convoy. A sweep was carried out in this direction firing star shell but no aontact with Sub was made.

19-. At 0110 when approximately 4000 yards ahead of the port column of the convoy. The S.D. Operator reported hydrophone effects at approximately 1200 yards, bearing Green 45°. Bearing was changing rapidly to the right, and helm was put to starboard to keep target ahead. An excellent contact was made at 1000 yards and ship's head was steadied with target steady at range of 600 yards, Submarine was not sighted, but contact was held and hydrophone effects heard until range of 200* yards when operator reported "Instantaneous Echoes". Five charges set to 100 feet were dropped, time to fire being determined by M.R.C.S. Tables and Stop Watch. Course was altered 30° to port, speed reduced to half, and contact was immediately regained. After running out to a distance of 1300 yards, we again stemmed the target and reduced speed to slow. Operator had no difficulty in holding target, it having practically no movement and no hydrophone effect was heard. At 900 yards, speed was increased to attacking speed and target was held to 200 yards. Time to fire was again determined by M.R.C.S. Tables and Stop Watch, eight depth charges being dropped, five set to 150 feet and three at 300 feet. It was intended to drop a ten charge pattern but the last heavy D/C jammed in the rails and the heavy D/C in the starboard thrower failed to fire due to the cartridge being improperly inserted and secured in the pistol.

20-. On the completion of the attack it was found that the fuse for the A/S compass and recorder had blown. The set was still transmitting by hand key and the line of light in the standard compass was still working. We endeavoured to regain contact with no success and, as by this time the convoy had reached the position of attack, we were forced to abandon the hunt. We avoided collision with a merchant ship by a matter of 300 to 400 yards.

21-. At 0151 SHEDIAC reported her position by R/T as being south of us, that she hoped to intercept us and that if she did not should she continue north with BURY to search for survivors. GLEAVES called by R/T at 0227 and asked if SHEDIAC had received my instructions directing her to search for survivors with BURY. At 0243 replied to GLEAVES affirmative. I sent a further signal to SHEDIAC to search along our course with BURY.

22-. At 0445 ARVIDA informed me by lamp that she was in V/S touch with SHEDIAC which was then passing convoy on port side with BURY heading north. As I was unable to see GLEAVES or SPENCER at this time I closed SHEDIAC (who already had 67 survivors on board) and ordered her to change positions with ARVIDA on port beam. ARVIDA then proceeded north with BURY.

23-. Unfortunately no recorder trace is available for these attacks. In Londonderry the ship was fitted with an amplifier A/S 44 Serial No. 598, Pattern 5805B on April 28th before the commencement of this voyage. During exercises with Submarine off Londonderry there was no trace on the Recorder at any time though good echoes were obtained from the Submarine.

During the

SECRET.

-4-

During the voyage we steamed alongside of ships in the convoy to within a range of 400 yards to test out the recorder and though good echoes were obtained, at no time could we ever get a recorder trace. The amplifier is in perfect working condition but the signal obtained is too weak to record a trace on the recorder even at 300 yards. In my opinion this type of amplifier is completely useless as far as obtaining a recorder trace with which to find the time to fire a pattern.

L. Woods
7/ **LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER, R.C.N.R.**



II.

No. 305.


FLAG OFFICER, NEWFOUNDLAND FORCE.

(Copy to:- Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare, Admiralty).

Forwarded.

2-. It seems obvious that a submarine contact was attacked, but with what success cannot be said.

30th. May, 1942.



L. R. Manning
**CAPTAIN, R.C.N.
CAPTAIN (D), NEWFOUNDLAND.**


III

Ref.No. 08821/PR/ST

TO:- Captain (D) Newfoundland.

Re paragraph 14. Is there any reason why "BITTERSWEET" could not have challenged the object that he thought might have been "ARVIDA"? That is the course of action which springs to my mind.

Naval Offices,
St. John's,
Newfoundland,
4th June, 1942.



L. W. Murray
(L. W. Murray),
Rear Admiral, R.C.N.,
Flag Officer Newfoundland Force.

SECRET

N.E.F. Form 4.

SECRET .

REPORT OF ATTACK ON A U-BOAT OR CONTACT.

1. Ship *H.M.C.S. BITTER SWEET.*
2. Date and Time *MAY 13 1942 0310 Z*
3. Position (latitude and Longitude) *52° 06' N. 34° 00' W.*
4. Wind, Weather, Visibility *SE. O.C. Vis. 5 miles. DURING MISTY RAIN - 1 mile.*
5. Tidal Information (Height, Direction, Speed) *NK.*
6. Depth of Water *1,800 FATHOMS*
7. Reason of Attack - (a) sighting
(b) asdic effect *ASDIC EFFECT.*
(c) torpedo track seen
(d) any other reason *H.E.*
8. Range on sighting or initial range of asdic contact
H.E. AT APPROX. 1200 YDS. ECHO AT 1000 YDS.
9. Nature of contact - (a) inclination *CLOSING.*
(b) hydrophone effect *MOTORS.*
(c) did target appear to move? *RAPIDLY RIGHT.*
(d) general remarks *DEFINITE SUB.*
10. Range at which contact was lost *INSTANTANEOUS ECHOES*
11. Method of obtaining time to fire - (a) recorder *M.R.C.S. TABLES.*
(b) log *STOP WATCH.*
(c) directing ship
12. Was contact confirmed by other ships? *NO.*
13. Was contact re-established after attack? *YES.*
14. Asdic conditions *EXCELLENT.*

Attack by Depth Charges (vide O.U. 5485, Chap. 1, para. 3) -

15. (a) Mark of Depth Charge *LIGHTS - MK. VII. HEAVY - MK. IX.*
(b) number carried *72*
(c) number dropped and/or fired from throwers *5 LIGHTS.*
(d) Depth settings *100 F.T.*
(e) Whether they functioned correctly *YES.*

Attack by Gunfire:-

16. (a) Size of gun
(b) Range
(c) type of shell and fuze
(d) Number of rounds fired
(e) Number of hits and their position on enemy
(f) Were all shells which hit seen to burst or penetrate

Attack of Torpedo:-

17. (a) Number of torpedoes fired
(b) Depth setting
(c) Course and speed of torpedoes
(d) Course and speed of enemy
(e) Ship's head on firing

RESULT OF ATTACK:-

18. (a) Submarine came to surface
(b) Oil patches seen
(c) Wreckage seen *AS ATTACK OCCURRED DURING THE NIGHT.*
(d) Doubtful *NO WRECKAGE OR OIL PATCHES WERE SEEN*
(e) Unsuccessful
19. Narrative (attached) - including action subsequent to the attack and a rough diagram of the action.
20. If submarine is sighted, a silhouette drawing, and a general description of her, especially any peculiarities are to be recorded overleaf.

At 0110 when approximately 4000 yards ahead of the port column of the convoy, the S.D. Operator reported hydrophone effects at approximately 1200 yards, bearing Green 45°. Bearing was changing rapidly to the right, and helm was put to starboard to keep target ahead. An excellent contact was made at 1000 yards and ship's head was steadied with target steady at range of 600 yards. Submarine was not sighted, but contact was held and hydrophone effects heard until range of 200 yards when operator reported, "Instantaneous Echoes". Five charges set at 100 feet were dropped, time to fire being determined by M.R.C.S. Tables and Stop Watch. Course was altered 30° to port, speed reduced to half, and contact was immediately regained. After running out to a distance of 1300 yards, we again stemmed the target and reduced speed to slow. Operator had no difficulty in holding target, it having practically no movement and no hydrophone effect was heard. At 900 yards, speed was increased to attacking speed and target was held to 200 yards. Time to fire was again determined by M.R.C.S. Tables and Stop Watch, eight depth charges being dropped, five set at 150 feet and three at 300 feet. It was intended to drop a ten charge pattern, but the last heavy D/C jammed in the rails and the heavy D/C in the starboard thrower failed to fire due to the cartridge being improperly inserted and secured in the pistol.

On the completion of the attack it was found that the fuse for the A/S compass and recorder had blown. The set was still transmitting by hand key and the line of light in the standard compass was still working. We endeavoured to regain contact with no success, and as by this time the convoy had reached the position of attack, we were forced to abandon the hunt. We avoided collision with a merchant ship by a matter of 300 to 400 yards.

RESULT OF ATTACK:-

- (a) Submarine came to surface
- (b) Oil patches seen
- (c) Wreckage seen
- (d) Doubtful
- (e) Unsuccessful

SECRET

SECOND ATTACK.
(DELIBERATE ATTACK)

N.E.F. Form 4.

SECRET

REPORT OF ATTACK ON A U-BOAT OR CONTACT.

1. Ship *H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET.*
2. Date and Time *MAY 13, 1942 0817Z*
3. Position (latitude and Longitude) *52° 05' N 34° 00' W.*
4. Wind, Weather, Visibility *SE. O.C. Vis. 5 Miles. DURING MISTY RAIN - 1 Mile*
5. Tidal Information (Height, Direction, Speed) *N.I.*
6. Depth of Water *1800 FATHOMS*
7. Reason of Attack - (a) sighting
(b) asdic effect *ASDIC EFFECT.*
(c) torpedo track seen
(d) any other reason
8. Range on sighting or initial range of asdic contact
ECHO REGAINED AT 400 YDS. & OPENED RANGE TO 1300 YDS.
Asdic Information:-
9. Nature of contact - (a) inclination *NO DOPPLER.*
(b) hydrophone effect
(c) did target appear to move? *HARDLY ANY MOVEMENT.*
(d) general remarks *TARGET REMAINED STEADY.*
10. Range at which contact was lost *INSTANT PNEUM. ECHOES.*
11. Method of obtaining time to fire - (a) recorder *M.R.CS. TABLES*
(b) log *STOP WATCH.*
(c) directing ship
12. Was contact confirmed by other ships? *NO.*
13. Was contact re-established after attack? *NO.*
14. Asdic conditions *EXCELLENT.*

Attack by Depth Charges (vide O.U. 5485, Chap. 1, para. 3) -

15. (a) Mark of Depth Charge *LIGHTS MK. VII. HEAVY MK. IX.*
(b) number carried *12*
(c) number dropped and/or fired from throwers *8*
(d) Depth settings *LIGHT 150 FT. 3 HEAVY 300 FT.*
(e) Whether they functioned correctly *1 HEAVY JAMMED IN RAILS*
STBD. HEAVY THROWN FAILED TO FIRE.
DUE TO CARTRIDGE BEING IMPROPERLY INSERTED & SECURED IN PISTOL

Attack by Gunfire:-

16. (a) Size of gun
(b) Range
(c) type of shell and fuze
(d) Number of rounds fired
(e) Number of hits and their position on enemy
(f) Were all shells which hit seen to burst or penetrate

Attack of Torpedo:-

17. (a) Number of torpedoes fired
(b) Depth setting
(c) Course and speed of torpedoes
(d) Course and speed of enemy
(e) Ship's head on firing

RESULT OF ATTACK:-

18. (a) Submarine came to surface
(b) Oil patches seen *NOT KNOWN BUT BELIEVED*
(c) Wreckage seen *TO BE REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL.*
(d) Doubtful
(e) Unsuccessful

19. Narrative (attached) - including action subsequent to the attack and a rough diagram of the action.
20. If submarine is sighted, a silhouette drawing, and a general description of her, especially any peculiarities are to be recorded overleaf.

SECRET

2181

DEPT.
NATIONAL DEFENCE

AUG 30 1941

~~1046-1-10~~
CANADA
1057-173-5

II.

1590

No. 305.
COMMODORE COMMANDING,
NEWFOUNDLAND.


(Copies to:- Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare, Admiralty.
BROADWATER.
BITTERSWEET).

Forwarded.

2-. It is considered unlikely that the contact attacked was a U-Boat.

Per: 3.9.41

Newfoundland.
18th August, 1941.



[Signature]

CAPTAIN (D).

III.

NO:01115/PR/BT.
NAVAL SECRETARY,
NAVAL SERVICE HEADQUARTERS,
OTTAWA.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
WESTERN APPROACHES.

Noted. No comments

[Signature]

H. N. LAY,
COMMANDER, R. C. N.
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS DIVISION
N. S. H. Q.

Submitted for information of the Department,
concurring with Captain (D).

Naval Offices,
St. John's, Nfld.
25th Aug., 1941.

[Signature]
(L. W. Murray)
Commodore R. C. N.,

Commodore Commanding Newfoundland.

20613

SECRET

From:- The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Broadwater"

Date:- 11th August, 1941.

RJ. 77/13.

To:- Captain (D)., Newfoundland, St. John's, N.F.

Attack by H.M.S. "Bittersweet" on assumed Submarine

Submitted:-

The attached report is forwarded.

(2) As "Bittersweet" had not regained contact two hours after attacking, and H.M.S. "Burwell" failed to obtain any contact, I considered the presence of a submarine doubtful.

(3) At the time of the attack there were whales in the vicinity.



W. H. A. Roberts

Lieutenant Commander, R.N.,

Commanding Officer.

NAVAL SERVICE

G - 144

16th July, 1941.

From THE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET.

Subject A/S ATTACK ON ASSUMED SUBMARINE, 1st JULY, 1941.

ToTHE COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. BROADWATER.

SUBMITTED:-

Enclosed please find my report on the attack on an assumed submarine made by this ship at 0030 G.M.T. on 1st July, 1941, in position $61^{\circ} 15'$ North Latitude, $17^{\circ} 40'$ West Longitude.

This report is made up as required by C.A.F.O. 4/40 and includes besides the body of the report, a narrative and diagram of the action in question.

(Sgd.) J.A. Woods.
Lieutenant-Commander, R.C.N.R.
Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET.

20613

REPORT OF ATTACK ON ENEMY SUBMARINE - (C.A.F.O.4/40)

1. H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET
2. July 1st, 1941.
3. 61° 15' N. 17° 40' W.
4. Wind - 4/5 Southwesterly.
Weather - Fine.
Visibility - 8.
5. Not applicable
6. Depth of Water - 1500 Fathoms.
7. (b) Asdic Contact
8. 600 yards
9. Asdic Information - (a) Doppler - Closing - definitely heard.
(b) Whistling Effect heard at time of
initial Contact.
(c) Yes
(d) See attached Memo.
10. 500 yards (Bearing on Starboard Quarter).
11. (a) Recorder.
12. No.
13. No.
14. Good.
15. Attack by Depth Charges (a) Mk. VII & IX
(b) 60
(c) Pattern of Ten - 5 of each
(d) Mk. VII 150 ft., Mk. IX 385 ft.
(e) Yes.
16. & 17. Not applicable.
18. Result of Attack - (b) Oil patch of 350 ft. square in vicinity
of attack.

(Sgd.) J.A. Woods.
Lieutenant-Commander, R.C.N.R.
Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET.

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Report of Attack on Assumed Submarine
made by H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET at 0030 July 1st, 1941
in position 61° 15' North Lat. 17° 40' West Long.

G.M.T.

0005/1 Contact made and reported to O.O.W. Bearing of target N.32°W. Mag. 600 yds.

0006/1 Commanding Officer called and A/S action stations sounded.

0008/1 Commanding Officer on bridge, operator reported echo moving right and whistling effect.

0009/1 Target moving rapidly right.

0010/1 Report of contact made to S.O. Escort, H.M.S. BROADWATER by R/T. A/C to N.25°W. (Mag.)

0011/1 Lost contact by echo.

0013/1 Starboard 10° of helm.

0015/1 Estimated range of target 1000 yards. Starboard 20°.

0016/1 Steadied on approximately S.20°E. Mag. and reduced speed to 3.6 knots.

0017/1 Regained echo distance 400 yards.

0018/1 Target moving right, starboard 10°. It was decided at this time not to drop depth charges due to slow speed at which ship was moving. Target moving rapidly right. Hard to starboard.

0020/1 Steadied on approximate course of N.45°W.

0023/1 Lost contact by echo.

0023/1 Starboard 20°.

0025/1 Half speed and steadied on approximate course N.40°E. (Mag.)

0027/1 Regained contact distance 700 yards, extent of target 10°. Full speed and starboard to centre bearing of target. S.45°E. (Mag.) Extent of Target approximately 10°.

0028/1 Contact moving left, Port 10°.

0029/1 Centre of target S.55°E., Range 300 yds. Steadied on course S.75°E., Mag.

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Report of Attack on Assumed Submarine made by H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET
July 1st, 1941 in position 61° 15' North 17° 40' West (Continued):

G.M.T.

0030/1 Fired Pattern "A".

R/T communication was maintained with S.O., Escort in H.M.S. BROADWATER and by R/T and lamp with H.M.S. BURWELL throughout attack and when hunting afterwards. H.M.S. BURWELL joined in hunt but no firm contact was obtained after initial attack. An extensive oil patch was observed and vicinity investigated with no contact being made or other evidence observed. Members of the ship's company reported the smell of Diesel oil but this oil patch may have been caused by H.M.S. BURWELL which had been pumping bilges.

At 0145/1 G.M.T. message was received from H.M.S. BROADWATER - "Do not get more than three hours from convoy and report at that time." H.M.S. BURWELL had in the meanwhile left to rejoin convoy. Hunting was continued until 0230/1 G.M.T. when we left to rejoin convoy. At 0430/1 G.M.T., with convoy in sight ahead, an aircraft circled ship reporting oil patch astern and then left to report to S.O. Escort. Reported by R/T to S.O. Escort and on return of plane at 0500/1 turned around and were directed to oil patch by A/C. At 0530/1 G.M.T. commenced investigating vicinity of oil patch and as no contact was made or any other evidence of submarine observed, proceeded to rejoin convoy at 0630/1 G.M.T. It is not considered this oil patch had anything to do with the attack inasmuch as the position of the latter was approximately 25 miles from the former.

In the accompanying sketch an effort has been made to reconstruct the attack, but as no accurate record was kept of the courses steered, except the initial course, first alteration and approach courses for final attack, much of the diagram may be faulty. The recorder having a constant paper speed, the minutes have been marked off and the ranges for each minute when in contact should be correct.

When contact was first obtained ship was steering convoy course at $7\frac{1}{4}$ knots and the rate of closing the range would indicate that the target was a moving one, on a slowly converging course. This was not realised at the time and at Zero plus 10 I estimated that the range was approximately 1000 yards and altered course towards target. Faint contact at 1500 yards obtained at this time was established as a vessel in the convoy and was disregarded.

The difficulty in obtaining contact between Zero plus 7 and Zero plus 12 may have been caused by the target then being head on. When contact was regained at Zero plus 12 the ship was proceeding at Dead Slow (3.6 knots) and realising that it was impossible to drop depth charges at this speed I decided to make another approach.

(3)

Report of Attack on Assumed Submarine made by H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET
July 1st, 1941 in position 61° 15' North 17° 40' West (Continued):

The A/S operator during the attack gave rapid and accurate
doppler information throughout.

.....
J. A. Woods,
Lieut. Commander, R.C.N.R.,
Commanding Officer,
H.M.C.S. BITTERSWEET.

July 11th, 1941

20613

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NATIONAL DEFENCE


H. Q. N.D. 1087-173-5

ENC. Attach Charts - (2)
H.A.C.S. Bittersweet.

Attachment Pocket
No. Sp. 1983



DIAGRAM OF A/S ATTACK BY H.M.C.S BITTERSWEET AT 0030 G.M.T / JULY 1st
 IN APPROXIMATE POSITION :- LAT 61.15'N LONG 17.40'W.



0 250 500 750 1000
 SCALE IN YARDS.

J. Woods
 Lt. Com R.C.N.R.

	—
Nil	— 25
300 YDS.	— 24
600 YDS.	— 23
700 YDS. FULL SPEED	— 22
	— 21
10 KNOTS	— 20
	— 19
	— 18
360 YDS.	— 17
200 YDS.	— 16
100 YDS.	— 15
75 YDS.	— 14
150 YDS.	— 13
375 YDS.	— 12
3.6 KNOTS	— 11
10	— 10
(Ship in convoy.)	— 9
	— 8
	— 7

100 Yds.	— 15
75 Yds.	— 14
150 Yds.	— 13
375 Yds.	— 12
3.6 knots	— 11
10	— 10
(Ship in convoy.)	— 9
	— 8
	— 7
500 Yds.	— 6
200 Yds.	— 5
150 Yds.	— 4
150 Yds.	— 3
275 Yds.	— 2
420 Yds.	— 1
600 Yds.	<u>Zero</u>
7 1/4 knots	

Recorder Trace of A/s Attack Carried
out by H.M.C.S. Bittern at
0030 G.M.T. / July 1st 1941 in Position
61° 15' N 17° 40' W.



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TITLE/TITRE :

HMCS Bittersweet Evan Rogers

FILE/DOSSIER :

REFERENCE NUMBER / NUMÉRO DE RÉFÉRENCE:

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